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Abstract
This paper investigates whether consumer search behavior di¤ers across zip codes
within the U.S.. As an application, daily gasoline price data covering virtually all gas
stations within the U.S. are employed to estimate the distribution of search costs in
each zip code. The results show that there are signicant di¤erences across zip codes
regarding the expected number of searches achieved before consumers purchase gaso-
line. In order to have a systematic explanation, such di¤erences are further connected
to geographic, demographic and economic conditions of the zip codes in a secondary
analysis. The corresponding results imply several strategies for gas stations in order
to maximize prots/markups; suggestions follow for policy makers and regulators to
reduce redistributive e¤ects of information barriers across locations.
JEL Classication: D12, D83, L81
Key Words: Consumer Search; Price Dispersion; Retail Gasoline.
Department of Economics, Florida International University. E-mail: hyilmazk@u.edu. Phone: +1-305-
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1. Introduction
Prices for the very same (homogeneous) good can be di¤erent across retailers. This is
most apparent in the gasoline market where gas stations post alternative prices even within
the same zip code in the U.S.. For example, consider Figure 1 where the gasoline price spread
has a median value of 14 cents with a range between 0 and 98 cents.1 Since these retail prices
are already controlled for gas-station and time xed e¤ects at the zip code level, they are
independent of any gas station characteristics such as their location, brand, competition
level, having a car wash or a convenient store as well as time-varying supply or demand
shocks. One potential explanation to these price spreads is then the lack of information
that consumers have, which has been connected to search costs in the literature following the
seminal article of Stigler (1961) followed by other inuential studies such as by Varian (1980),
Burdett and Judd (1983), and Stahl (1989). In particular, if consumers do not search for
lower prices, retailers may easily charge higher markups or get involved in collusive behavior.
Accordingly, policy makers have considered this lack of information as a potential problem
reducing consumer welfare due to information frictions.2
Within this picture, we investigate the search behavior across consumers in di¤erent ve-
digit zip codes within the U.S., where gasoline purchases account for approximately 5% of
consumer spending.3 First, we would like to know whether the search behavior of consumers
di¤ers across zip codes; we are particularly interested in the expected number of searches
achieved by consumers before making a purchase. Accordingly, by using retail level gasoline
price data obtained from virtually all gas stations with the U.S. as an application, we rst
estimate the expected number of searches and the corresponding search cost distributions
at the zip code level. We achieve this by considering the implications of a non-sequential
consumer search model with heterogeneous search costs. The model is the multi-region
version of the model introduced by Moraga-Gonzalez and Wildenbeest (2008) which is an
oligopolistic version of the model proposed in Hong and Shum (2006) who have generalized
the non-sequential consumer search model of Burdett and Judd (1983) by adding search cost
heterogeneity. The results show that the expected number of searches have a median of
1.66 across zip codes, which implies that consumers do not search much on average before
1Gasoline price spread is dened as the di¤erence between the maximum and the minimum price in gas
stations in a given zip code after controlling for gas-station and time xed e¤ects where the latter includes
both day and hour xed e¤ects. See the data section below for further details.
2Consider the case of South Korea where gas stations are required to post their retail prices on Opinet.
Policy makers in other countries such as Austria, parts of Australia, Luxembourg or parts of Canada have
also adopted regulatory pricing rules for gas stations; see Haucap and Müller (2012).
3See Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2014, for example: http://www.bls.gov/cex/2014/combined/quintile.pdf
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purchasing gasoline. However, the estimates for the expected number of searches range
between 0.17 and 12.94 across zip codes; hence, there are signicant di¤erences in the search
behavior of consumers across zip codes.
Understanding the reasons behind this heterogeneity in the search behavior of consumers
across regions is the key to reduce the redistributive e¤ects of information frictions. In
particular, if information frictions are systematically higher in certain regions, policy makers
can reduce them only by achieving region-specic policies. Instead, if a common multi-region
policy is conducted, although it would reduce information frictions in all regions, it would not
necessarily reduce redistributive e¤ects of information frictions across regions.4 Accordingly,
in a secondary analysis, we investigate whether the heterogeneity in the estimated consumer
search behavior can be explained systematically across zip codes. In particular, we attempt to
connect the estimated expected number of searches to geographic, demographic and economic
conditions of zip codes. It is found that geographical frictions due to factors such as the
overall area of the zip code, population density or average distance between gas stations all
contribute positively to the expected number of searches achieved by consumers. On the
other hand, income and commuting time are shown to be negatively related to the expected
number of searches across zip codes, potentially capturing the opportunity cost of time for
making a search. Consumers in zip codes with individuals working in di¤erent industries
are shown to have di¤erent search behavior as well, with industries such as retail trade and
public administration contributing most to the expected number of searches. It is also shown
that consumers in zip codes with higher percentage of Black or African American people
search more compared to those with white or Asian people; consumers in zip codes with
higher percentage of females are also shown to search more compared to other zip codes.
Based on these results, several strategies are implied for gas stations in order to maximize
prots/markups; suggestions follow for policy makers and regulators in order to reduce the
redistributive e¤ects of information frictions across locations.
This paper belongs to the literature estimating the search behavior of consumers by using
only price data. Within this picture, Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) have estimated search
cost distribution of the U.S. mutual funds market, Hong and Shum (2006) have estimated that
of online textbooks, and Moraga-Gonzalez and Wildenbeest (2008) and Moraga-Gonzalez et
al. (2013) have estimated that of computer memory chips. These papers have focused on
the estimation of a single market, while this study deviates from them by considering the
4A recent example of such a local policy (to reduce information frictions) has been achieved by Palm Beach
County, Florida (PBC) that has passed and put into e¤ect an ordinance regarding the size of cash versus
credit card prices at gas stations; however, this ordinance has been trumped by a common multi-location
policy of the State of Florida due to its new law that binds all counties within Florida.
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segmentation of the U.S. gasoline market based on the zip codes that the gas stations are
located at. Such a strategy in this paper is essential to investigate the relationship between
the consumer search behavior and geographic, demographic and economic conditions across
geographical locations.
This paper also belongs to literature based on the consumer search behavior in the retail
gasoline market. Studies such as by Marvel (1976), Lewis (2008), Chandra and Tappata
(2011), and Pennerstorfer et al. (2014) have investigated how the price dispersion in the
gasoline market can be connected to the models of costly consumer search. However, these
studies have been limited due to the reduced-form testing of the comparative static rela-
tionships implied by their models. In contrast, this paper considers the information coming
from the overall distribution of the consumer search behavior across zip codes within the
U.S.. Within this literature, Nishida and Remer (2015; NR henceforth) is the closest study
to this paper. By using the same estimation methodology, NR estimate the average and the
standard deviation of search costs across markets using a similar data set on gasoline prices.
Their results show that the distribution of consumer search costs varies signicantly across
geographic markets and that the distribution of household income is closely associated with
the search cost distribution. This paper deviates from NR in several dimensions. First and
most importantly, we focus how the expected number of searches changes across markets,
while NR focus on how the corresponding search costs change across markets. In other words,
while we focus on the quantity of searches across markets, NR focus on the price of searches.
Second, our data set, which is unique to this paper due to our e¤orts in collecting our own
data, covers virtually all gas stations within the U.S., while their investigation focuses only
on the states of California, Florida, New Jersey, and Texas by borrowing a subset of the data
set that has been previously utilized by Chandra and Tappata (2011). Third, we investigate
how the search behavior of consumers changes across zip codes, while NR focus on how the
search behavior of consumers changes across geographic markets dened as great circles with
a radius of 1.5 miles; having an investigation at the zip code level has the advantage of con-
necting zip code characteristics such as income, poverty, population density, commuting time,
industries worked, area, race and sex to the search behavior of consumers as we achieve in
this paper. Finally, while we control the retail level gasoline prices for retailer/station xed
e¤ects and time xed e¤ects, where the latter include both day and hour (of data collection)
xed e¤ects, NR controls only for retailer/station xed e¤ects. Regarding the testable im-
plications of the estimated model as discussed by Moraga-Gonzalez and Wildenbeest (2008),
missing to control for time xed e¤ects may lead to biased results, because, according to
the model that is common between this paper and NR, (i) prices should be dispersed at any
given moment in time, (ii) there should be variation in the position of a typical retailer in the
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price ranking, and (iii) supply or demand shocks should be absent during the sample period.
These assumptions can only be satised by controlling the retail level gasoline prices for time
xed e¤ects, together with retailer/station xed e¤ects, at the market level; accordingly, we
control the retail level gasoline prices for both retailer/station and time xed e¤ects for each
zip code individually. However, NR controls retail prices only for retailer/station xed e¤ects
across all gas stations in their sample (rather than market by market); this may create an
additional bias in their results due to not satisfying the assumptions mentioned above.
The next section introduces the consumer search model. Section 3 estimates the expected
number of searches together with the distribution of search costs across zip codes using the
daily gasoline price data. Section 4 connects the expected number of searches to the zip code
characteristics depending on geographic, demographic and economic conditions. Section 5
concludes by providing suggestions for both gas stations (in order to maximize prot) and
policy makers (for regulatory purposes).
2. Consumer Search Model
We employ a non-sequential consumer search model with heterogeneous search costs.
The model is the multi-region version of the model introduced by Moraga-Gonzalez and
Wildenbeest (2008) which is an oligopolistic version of the model proposed in Hong and
Shum (2006) who have generalized the non-sequential consumer search model of Burdett
and Judd (1983) by adding search cost heterogeneity. The economic environment consists
of regions that are inhabited by retailers and consumers. Unlike Moraga-Gonzalez et al.
(2013), who assume that di¤erent consumer markets have the same underlying search cost
distribution, we focus on market segmentation where each region has its own search cost
distribution; this is necessary to investigate whether consumer search behavior di¤ers across
zip codes within the U.S..
Region r is inhabited by Nr retailers who sell a homogenous good with a common unit
cost of mr, although the price charged by each retailer may be di¤erent. Consumers in each
region know the distribution of retail prices, however they do not know which retailer charges
which price; accordingly, they search for a subset of retailers to obtain information about
prices. In order to obtain any price information beyond the rst price observed, consumers
in region r have to pay a randomly drawn search cost of cr that di¤ers across consumers in
that region according to the distribution of search costs given by F cr . Total search cost crir
of a consumer in region r is simply determined by the multiplication of the search cost cr
and the number of retailers sampled ir.
The symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in region r is denoted by the distribution of
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prices F pr with density f
p
r (pr). Given the behavior of the retailers in region r, the consumer
decides on the optimal number of retailers to search according to the following expression:
ir (cr) = argmin
ir>1
cr (ir   1) +
Z pr
pr
irpr (1  F pr (pr))ir 1 fpr (pr) dpr (2.1)
where pr and pr represent the lower and upper bound of the support of F pr (pr). Since ir (cr)
must be an integer, Equation 2.1 corresponds to the partition of consumers in region r intoNr
subsets, each subset representing the fraction qir of consumers searching for ir (= 1; 2; :::; Nr)
retailers; it is implied that
PNr
ir=1
qir = 1.
In order to calculate the fraction qir in region r, consider the following search cost of a
consumer who is indi¤erent between searching ir retailers and ir + 1 retailers:
ir = Ep
1:ir
r   Ep1:ir+1r (2.2)
where Ep1:irr represents the expected minimum price in a sample of ir prices drawn from
the price distribution of F pr (pr). Since 
i
r is a decreasing function of ir, the fractions of
consumers sampling ir prices in region r as implied as follows:
q1r = 1  F cr
 
1r

qir = F
c
r
 
i 1r
  F cr  ir , i = 2; 3; ::; Nr   1 (2.3)
qNr = F
c
r
 
N 1r

where it is optimal for the retailers to mix in prices, given the search behavior of consumers.
The equilibrium price distribution in region r is obtained by considering the indi¤erence
condition that a retailer should obtain the same level of prots from charging any price in
the support of F pr (pr):
(pr  mr)
"
NrX
ir=1
irq
ir
r
Nr
(1  F pr (pr))ir 1
#
=
q1r (pr  mr)
Nr
(2.4)
where q1r represents the fraction of consumers who do not compare prices; thus, some of
them end up with paying the upper bound pr of the price distribution. It is implied that the
minimum price charged in region r is given by:
pr =
q1r (pr  mr)PNr
ir=1
irqirr
+mr (2.5)
where the rst term on the right hand side represents the additive markup on the minimum
price. It is implied that the ratio of the maximum additive markup to the minimum additive
markup within region r is given as follows:
pr  mr
pr  mr =
Sr
q1r
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where the numerator of the right hand side Sr

=
PNr
ir=1
irq
ir
r

is the expected number of
retailers searched in order to nd lower prices, while the denominator is the fraction of
consumers who do not compare prices. This ratio would be equal to one when the minimum
price is equal to the maximum price (i.e., pr = pr), implying that none of the consumers would
compare prices (i.e., Sr =
PNr
ir=1
irq
ir
r = q
1
r = 1); this is due to having the same expected
minimum price across di¤erent number of retailers sampled when prices are the same. As the
maximum price gets higher compared to the minimum price (i.e., when the price dispersion
increases across retailers), the fraction of consumers who do not compare prices q1r would go
down (i.e., some consumers would start searching for lower prices); this is due to positive
potential gains out of making costly search. In an extreme case in which the price dispersion
goes to innity, q1r would go to zero, implying that all consumers would make some search
for lower prices.
We test the implications of this model on the dispersion of gasoline prices across gas
stations next.
3. Estimation of Search Costs
3.1. Data and Estimation Methodology
Using gasoline price data obtained at the retail (i.e., gas station) level, the regions in
the model are matched with ve-digit zip codes within the U.S.. The gasoline prices have
been downloaded at midnight of each day from MapQuest (http://gasprices.mapquest.com/)
by using an automated procedure (written in Matlab) that scans the code of publicly avail-
able web pages, identies relevant pieces of gasoline price information, and stores the data.5
MapQuest receives gasoline prices from Oil Price Information Service (OPIS), a leading
provider of petroleum data collecting gas price data based on eet transaction data.6 MapQuest
gas prices are updated as qualifying transactions are processed by OPIS. We consider the
daily gasoline price data for the whole month of July 2015. The data cover daily price ob-
servations from 112,515 gas stations within the U.S. for the whole month of July 2015 (i.e.,
for 31 days).
As shown by Hong and Shum (2006) and Moraga-Gonzalez and Wildenbeest (2008),
Equations 2.1-2.5 provide enough information for the maximum likelihood estimation of the
search cost distribution by using only retail price data; we refer the reader to these papers for
5This technique is commonly called web scraping.
6Focusing on other topics and time periods, earlier studies such as by Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006), Doyle
and Samphantharak (2008), and Chandra and Tappata (2011) have also used this data set.
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technical details of the estimation.7 Since we focus on the potential heterogeneity of search
cost distributions across zip codes, we achieve the estimation for each zip code individually.
In order to match the gasoline price data with the consumer search model, it assumed that
retailers in any zip code play a stationary repeated game of nite horizon so, in every period,
the data should reect the equilibrium of the static game analyzed in the model section.
As shown by Moraga-Gonzalez and Wildenbeest (2008), this assumption has some testable
implications at the zip code level such as (i) prices should be dispersed at any given moment
in time, (ii) there should be variation in the position of a typical retailer in the price ranking,
and (iii) supply or demand shocks should be absent during the sample period. On top of these
assumptions, we also have an assumption coming from the consumer search model that the
investigated good (i.e., gasoline) is a homogenous good. However, in a particular zip code,
there are many factors that would violate these assumptions for retail level gasoline prices.
The rst two assumptions, together with the homogeneity assumption, may be violated due to
some gas stations almost always setting higher prices due their brands and/or locations, while
the second assumption may be violated due to daily changes in gasoline prices. Accordingly,
we have to control for these factors before we can continue with the maximum likelihood
estimation. By following the standard practice in many structural auction models (e.g.
Haile et al., 2003; Bajari et al., 2006; An et al., 2010) and consumer search studies such
as by Wildenbeest (2011), we achieve this by controlling the retail level gasoline prices for
retailer/station xed e¤ects and time xed e¤ects, where the latter include both day and hour
(of data collection) xed e¤ects.8 In particular, for gas stations located in a particular zip
code, we simply run a regression of gasoline prices on retailer/station xed e¤ects and time
xed e¤ects in that zip code; we consider the residuals of this regression (plus the estimated
constant that is specic to the zip code considered) as our measure of retail prices for the
rest of this paper.9
Finally, it has been shown by Moraga-Gonzalez and Wildenbeest (2008) that the mea-
surement error in the number of retailers may lead to biased estimates of the search cost
distribution. Accordingly, we have to make sure that the number of gas stations in our sam-
ple in fact matches with the number of gas stations within the U.S.. We nd that the number
of gas stations (112,515) in our sample is very close to the number of gas stations in the 2013
County Business Patterns of the U.S. Census Bureau (i.e., the latest data available), which
is 112,458. Therefore, we can safely claim that our daily gasoline price data cover virtually
7The Matlab codes for the estimation of search costs can be found at
http://kelley.iu.edu/mwildenb/code.html.
8The approximate time of the gasoline price update is provided by MapQuest.
9Such a strategy is also important to control for gasoline markets that are inherently di¤erentiated by the
amenities o¤ered and their locations (see e.g. Houde, 2012; Langer and McRae, 2014).
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all gas stations within the U.S..
3.2. Estimation Results
The estimation is achieved for each zip code individually. The summary of the maximum
likelihood estimations is given in Table 1 where the results across zip codes have been sorted
with respect to the estimated expected number of searches Sr

=
PNr
ir=1
irq
ir
r

; the corre-
sponding percentiles of zip codes are depicted. The corresponding estimates of critical search
cost values across zip codes are given in Figure 2 (up to 10 to save space). Both Table
1 and Figure 2 show the importance of having an analysis at the zip code level, because
the estimated values, which are all signicant at the 5% level, are shown to be changing
signicantly across locations.
As is evident in Table 1, the median Sr across zip codes is 1.66 with range between 0.17
and 12.94. Therefore, on average, consumers do not search much for lower prices across
gas stations. The median Sr estimate of 1.66 is consistent with other studies in the litera-
ture such as by Moraga-Gonzalez and Wildenbeest (2008) who have estimated Sr as 1.45,
1.60, 1.62 and 1.93 for di¤erent computer memory chips by using price data obtained from
www.shopper.com. Compared to Hong and Shum (2006) who investigate the search costs
for several economics and statistics textbook and estimate Sr as 1.06, 1.25, 1.26 and 1.47,
however, the median Sr estimate of 1.66 in this paper is slightly higher.
In the zip code with the median Sr, the markups range between 7 cents and 22 cents.
When we consider all other zip codes, although markups di¤er across stations, the median
(across zip codes) di¤erence between the minimum price and the unit cost is about 5.7
cents, while the median di¤erence between the maximum price and the unit cost is about
24.13 cents. These markups, which have completely been obtained from the estimation of
the proposed model, is consistent with the average markups discussed in the media or by
organizations making research/surveys on gas stations; e.g., according to The Wall Street
Journal, "The station owners, in turn, set their gas prices for consumers so that the average
markup, or gross margin, on gas is typically around 15 cents or 16 cents a gallon."10 Similarly,
according to The National Association of Convenience Stores, "Over the past ve years, the
retail mark-up has averaged 17.1 cents per gallon."11
By going into more details in Table 1, we observe that about 58% of consumers do not
search for lower prices in the zip code with the median Sr, although this percentage ranges
between 10% and 80% in the zip codes revealed in this table. This value is consistent earlier
10http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303299604577323661725847318
11http://www.nacsonline.com/YourBusiness/FuelsReports/GasPrices_2014/
Documents/2014NACSFuelsReport_full.pdf.
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studies in the literature such as by Hong and Shum (2006) who estimate q1r ranging between
0.364 and 0.633 for di¤erent textbooks, while it is higher compared to studies by Moraga-
Gonzalez and Wildenbeest (2008) or Moraga-Gonzalez et al. (2013) who estimate q1r ranging
between 0.22 and 0.34 for di¤erent computer memory chips.
Although these results are of interest by themselves, we particularly would like to focus
on their distribution across zip codes. More specically, we would like to understand whether
the estimated expected number of searches Sr are systematically di¤erent across zip codes
based on zip code characteristics; we achieve such an investigation next.
4. Number of Stations Searched across Zip Codes
Consumer search patterns may di¤er across zip codes due to several zip code character-
istics. In this paper, we distinguish between such characteristics by focusing on geographic,
demographic and economic conditions of zip codes.
The geographic indicators that we consider include the area of the zip code (measured
in square miles) as well as the average distance between gas stations (measured in miles),
although the latter may also be considered as an economic condition. The demographic
indicators consist of population density (measured by workers over 16 years of age per square
mile) as well as the distribution of race and sex in zip codes. The economic indicators consist
of income and poverty level of individuals as well as their commuting time (measured in
minutes) and the industries that they work.
The data for zip code area have been obtained from the U.S. Gazetteer ZIP Code le from
the U.S. Census Bureau. The average distance between gas stations has been calculated
using the gas station address information given in the OPIS data described above. The
demographic and economic indicators have been obtained from U.S. Census Bureau 5-Year
American Community Survey between 2009-2013.
4.1. Benchmark Case
We start with investigating the relationship between the dependent variable of log esti-
mated expected number of searches Sr and the independent variables consisting of average
distance between gas stations, area, population density, median income and average com-
muting time. The results of this regression is given in Table 2 where all variables enter the
regression signicantly. As is evident, consumers search more in zip codes where the average
distance between gas stations is longer. In particular, as the average distance (in miles) be-
tween gas stations increases by 1%, consumers on average search for more stations by 0.063%
across zip codes. This result suggests that consumers would double their expected number of
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stations searched when average distance goes up by about 15 times. Similarly, as the size of
the zip code increases in by 1% in square miles, consumers search for more stations by 0.48%,
suggesting that consumers would double their expected number of stations searched when
the zip code area is tripled. According to the consumer search model, the last two results
are mostly due to fact that gasoline price spreads (measured by the di¤erence between the
highest and the lowest prices) are higher in zip codes with spatially dispersed gas stations.12
Hence, as consumers search more, there will be positive potential gains out of making search,
which is in line with our discussion in the model section. Likewise, consumers would double
their expected number of stations searched when zip code population density goes up by 2.5
times, mostly due to lower search costs when there are more gas stations per square mile
(representing higher supply in such locations).
Median income is shown to be negatively related with the expected number of searches,
where the coe¢ cient is about  0:275; it is implied that consumers would halve their expected
number of searches when their income is quadrupled. This is obviously due to the opportunity
cost of searching for lower gasoline prices where higher income consumers do not nd it
protable enough. The expected number of stations searched decrease with the commuting
time across zip codes. Specically, consumers halve their expected number of searches when
commuting time is quadrupled. One possible reason may be the lack of time that consumers
with longer commuting time have, while another reason may be methodological. Regarding
the latter, we have so far employed average/median zip code characteristics in order to
explain the expected number of searches across gas stations. Nevertheless, such an approach
may suppress important information regarding the distribution of consumers having di¤erent
characteristics within a given zip code. Accordingly, we investigate potential nonlinearities
in some of our independent variables, below.
4.2. Income, Poverty and Industries Worked
We start with considering the e¤ects of di¤erent income groups (in percentage terms) on
the expected number of searches. We achieve this by keeping the benchmark case independent
variables (except for the median income) in the regression.13 The results are given in Table
3 where the benchmark case independent variables are still signicant and very close to their
12In this paper, the correlation (across zip codes) between log average distance between stations and log
price di¤erence between the most and the least expensive stations is about 0.19. Moreover, such a positive
correlation is not unique to this paper; e.g., studies such as by Chandra and Tappata (2011) have also shown
similar evidence.
13Within the overall set of income groups, we also drop one group in the regression analysis in order to
avoid any multicollinearity problem. We follow this strategy for the rest of tables in this paper.
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estimated values in Table 2.
As is evident in Table 3, zip codes with higher percentage of groups with annual income
between $10,000 and $34,999 search more, while other income groups do not contribute to
the expected number of searches. Within the groups that have income between $10,000
and $34,999, the group with an income between $10,000 and $14,999 search most with a
corresponding coe¢ cient of 0.015, followed by groups with income levels ranging from $25,000
to $34,999 and from $15,000 to $24,999. One interesting observation belongs to the income
group at the bottom of the income level with an annual income of at most $9,999. Potentially,
people within this income group are the ones who cannot a¤ord owning a car in the rst place;
therefore, it is not surprising that zip codes with higher percentage of these low income
consumers do not search for lower gasoline prices compared to other income groups. Another
result in Table 3 refers to the consumers in zip codes that do not search more than other
zip codes due to having income levels higher than (or equal to) $35,000; this is due to the
insignicant coe¢ cients in front of such income groups. As in the benchmark case, this is
again due to the opportunity cost of searching for lower gasoline prices where higher income
consumers do not nd it protable enough.
The results based on the relationship between the log expected number of searches and
poverty are given in Table 4. In terms of economic intuition, the results are similar to the
ones that we have in Table 3. In particular, consumers in zip codes su¤ering from poverty
search for more gas stations before purchasing gasoline, while consumers at or above 150
percent of the poverty level do not search more than other consumers.
Consumers working in di¤erent industries also have di¤erent search behavior, after con-
trolling for benchmark case variables, according to Table 5. As is evident, consumers in
zip codes that have higher percentage of individuals working in retail trade and public
administration search most with a signicant coe¢ cient of 0.019, followed by transporta-
tion/warehousing/utilities and information/nance/insurance/real estate and rental. On the
other hand, consumers in zip codes with higher percentage of individuals working in wholesale
trade do not search more compared to other industries.
4.3. Commuting Time, Race and Sex
In this subsection, we further investigate the relationship between expected number of
searches and zip code characteristics regarding the commuting time of individuals, this time
by distinguishing among consumers having alternative commuting times within zip codes,
together with focusing on other zip code characteristics such as race and sex.
The results for commuting time are given in Table 6 where we keep the independent
variables in the benchmark case (except for the median commuting time). As is evident, the
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zip codes with higher percentage of consumers driving 10 to 14 minutes to work search most
with a highly signicant coe¢ cient of 0.013, followed by those driving 45 to 59 minutes, 15
to 19 minutes, 30 to 34 minutes and less than 10 minutes. Hence, although it is hard to talk
about a pattern across alternative commuting times, we can at least say that consumers in
zip codes with commuting times between 45 to 59 minutes search for more gas stations before
making a purchase compared to those with commuting times between 15 to 44 minutes or
less than 10 minutes.
The results based on race are given in Table 7, while those based on sex are given in Table
8. We observe in Table 7 that consumers in zip codes with higher percentage of white, Asian
and Black or African American people search for more stations compared to the other races,
after controlling for benchmark case variables. Within these groups, zip codes with higher
percentage of Black or African American consumers search most with a signicant coe¢ cient
of 0.012, followed by white and Asian consumers. In Table 8, we observe that consumers in
zip codes with higher percentage of female people search more compared to other zip codes
with a signicant coe¢ cient of 0.007, again after controlling for benchmark case variables.
5. Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications
Retail prices di¤er signicantly across retailers, even after controlling for retailer char-
acteristics and time-varying shocks. This paper has considered the heterogeneity in the
consumer search behavior as a potential explanation for the heterogeneity of retail price dis-
tributions across locations. Within this picture, we have focused on the determinants of the
expected number of searches (that consumers achieve before making a purchase) across zip
codes based on geographic, demographic and economic conditions. Based on the maximum
likelihood estimation of a consumer search model, we recover the distribution of search costs
for each zip code in the U.S. by considering the gasoline purchasing behavior of consumers
as an application for which we have daily price data covering virtually all gas stations within
the U.S..
The results have shown that geographical factors increasing the price dispersion across
gas stations such as the average distance between them, overall area of the zip code or
population density all contribute positively (across zip codes) to the expected number of
searches achieved by consumers before making a purchase. On the other hand, income
and commuting time have been shown to be negatively related to the expected number of
searches across zip codes, potentially capturing the opportunity cost of time for making a
search. Consumers in zip codes with individuals working in di¤erent industries have also
been shown to having di¤erent search behavior, with industries such as retail trade and
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public administration contributing most to the expected number of searches. We have also
shown that consumers in zip codes with higher percentage of Black or African American
people search more compared to those with white or Asian people. Finally, consumers in zip
codes with higher percentage of females have shown to search more compared to other zip
codes.
Retailers can charge higher markups if consumers do not search for lower prices, which is
one of the implications of the model used in this paper. Combining this information with the
fact that gasoline is a relatively inelastic product (according to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration14), it is implied by the results of this paper that gas stations can achieve
higher prot margins if they would be located in zip codes in which gas stations are closer
to each other; this partly explains why we observe gas stations located very close to each
other in certain zip codes. Similarly, higher prot margins can be achieved in zip codes with
smaller areas, lower population densities, higher income and/or higher commuting times;
e.g., gas station prots would be maximized in zip codes with individuals having annual
income levels above $35K. On the other hand, such prots would be lower in zip codes with
higher percentage of Black or African American individuals, followed by those with higher
percentage of white and Asian individuals. The prots would be lower also in zip codes
with higher percentage of individuals working in industries such as retail trade and public
administration. Finally, zip codes with a higher percentage of male population are also good
locations to have a gas station in order to maximize prots.
Policy suggestions directly correspond to the duality of the results based on gas-station
markups across zip codes. In particular, if the main objective is to reduce the redistribu-
tive e¤ects of information frictions across locations, the corresponding suggestion is that the
policy makers should consider the heterogeneity of consumer search behavior across markets
(where the heterogeneity has been shown to depend on geographic, demographic and eco-
nomic conditions) by conducting local policies rather than a common multi-location policy.
It is important to mention that all of these implications are robust to the consideration of
gas station characteristics (e.g., its location, competition level, brand, having a car wash or
a convenience store, etc.) as well as supply and demand shocks in the gasoline market, since
we control for all of these factors in the investigation. However, the results are not without
caveats. In particular, we are well aware of the situation that consumer search behavior may
not be segmented at the zip code level, although such a strategy was necessary in order to
understand whether the estimated expected number of searches change across zip codes and
whether such estimates can further be connected to geographic, demographic and economic
conditions. The attempts to address this issue in the literature in studies such as by Nishida
14See http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=19191
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and Remer (2015) are encouraging; however, they are subject to very similar criticisms, since
they use other ad hoc market segmentation measures such as geographic markets dened
as great circles with a radius of 1.5 miles. Therefore, unless the corresponding data for the
market segmentation of consumers would be available (e.g., the geographical space covered
by each consumer in order to make a search before making a purchase), together with data
on geographic, demographic and economic characteristics of such consumers, the results in
this paper are not subject to any further improvement.
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Table 1 - Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results for Search Costs 
 Minimum 10th Percentile 
25th 
Percentile 
50th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
90th 
Percentile Maximum 
Expected Number of Searches ( rS ) 0.17 1.11 1.21 1.66 2.88 4.25 12.94 
Minimum Price ( rp ) 2.54 2.98 2.91 2.58 3.16 2.38 2.18 
Maximum Price ( rp ) 2.61 3.16 3.02 2.73 3.38 2.56 3.15 
1
rq  0.10 0.80 0.60 0.58 0.60 0.24 0.30 
2
rq  0.04 0.16 0.31 0.34 0.28 0.53 0.38 
3
rq  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4
rq  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5...10
rq  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
11... rN
rq  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.23 0.32 
Unit Cost ( rm ) 2.54 2.76 2.86 2.51 3.10 2.37 2.16 
Number of Stations ( rN ) 3 7 7 5 14 13 37 
Sample Size 59 165 148 81 250 262 549 
Log-likelihood -88.70 -314.33 -345.44 -161.00 -473.67 -577.72 -508.69 
Corresponding Zip Code 55046 10468 19064 25315 95351 76903 38305 
Notes: The estimation has been achieved at the zip code level. The estimation results have been sorted across zip codes with respect to the 
estimated expected number of searches; the corresponding percentiles of zip codes are depicted in this table. All estimates are significant at the 5% 
level.  
Table 2 - Determinants of the Expected Number of Consumer Searches 
 Dependent Variable:  Log Expected Number of Searches in a Zip Code 
  
Log Average Distance between 0.063*** 
Gas Stations in the Zip Code (0.009) 
  
Log Zip Code Area  0.480*** 
(square miles) (0.013) 
  
Log Zip Code Population Density  0.398*** 
(workers per square mile) (0.011) 
  
Log Zip Code Median Income -0.275*** 
(US$) (0.027) 
  
Log Average Commuting Time  -0.252*** 
in the Zip Code (minutes) (0.032) 
  
Sample Size 4332 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.314 
  
Notes: *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors are given in 
parenthesis. All regressions include constants that are not shown here. The regression is by OLS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 - Number of Consumer Searches and Income 
 Dependent Variable:  Log Expected Number of Searches in a Zip Code 
  
Log Average Distance between 0.060*** 
Gas Stations in the Zip Code (0.009) 
  
Log Zip Code Area  0.499*** 
(square miles) (0.014) 
  
Log Zip Code Population Density  0.415*** 
(workers per square mile) (0.011) 
  
Log Average Commuting Time  -0.268*** 
in the Zip Code (minutes) (0.033) 
  
$1 to $9,999 or less 0.001 
(percentage of workers) (0.002) 
  
$10,000 to $14,999 0.015*** 
(percentage of workers) (0.004) 
  
$15,000 to $24,999 0.006*** 
(percentage of workers) (0.002) 
  
$25,000 to $34,999 0.009*** 
(percentage of workers) (0.003) 
  
$35,000 to $49,999 0.003 
(percentage of workers) (0.003) 
  
$50,000 to $64,999 0.006 
(percentage of workers) (0.004) 
  
$65,000 to $74,999 -0.007 
(percentage of workers) (0.007) 
  
Sample Size 4323 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.323 
Notes: *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors are given in 
parenthesis. All regressions include constants that are not shown here. The regression is by OLS. 
Table 4 - Number of Consumer Searches and Poverty 
 Dependent Variable:  Log Expected Number of Searches in a Zip Code 
  
Log Average Distance between 0.064*** 
Gas Stations in the Zip Code (0.009) 
  
Log Zip Code Area  0.483*** 
(square miles) (0.014) 
  
Log Zip Code Population Density  0.394*** 
(workers per square mile) (0.011) 
  
Log Average Commuting Time  -0.290*** 
in the Zip Code (minutes) (0.032) 
  
100 to 149 percent of the poverty 0.014*** 
level (percentage of workers) (0.004) 
  
At or above 150 percent of the poverty -0.003 
Level (percentage of workers) (0.002) 
  
Sample Size 4327 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.315 
Notes: *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors are given in 
parenthesis. All regressions include constants that are not shown here. The regression is by OLS. 
 
 
 
Table 5 - Number of Consumer Searches and Industries Worked 
 Dependent Variable:  Log Expected Number of Searches in a Zip Code 
  
Log Average Distance between 0.053*** 
Gas Stations in the Zip Code (0.009) 
  
Log Zip Code Area  0.522*** 
(square miles) (0.015) 
  
Log Zip Code Population Density  0.427*** 
(workers per square mile) (0.013) 
  
Log Zip Code Median Income -0.301*** 
(US$) (0.046) 
  
Log Average Commuting Time  -0.311*** 
in the Zip Code (minutes) (0.039) 
  
Agriculture, forestry, fishing  0.008* 
and hunting, and mining (0.005) 
  
Construction 0.015*** 
 (0.005) 
  
Manufacturing 0.014*** 
 (0.004) 
  
Wholesale trade 0.008 
 (0.008) 
  
Retail trade 0.019*** 
 (0.005) 
  
Transportation and warehousing, 0.017*** 
and utilities (0.005) 
  
Information and finance and insurance, 0.016*** 
and real estate and rental (0.005) 
  
Professional, scientific, management, and 0.014*** 
administrative and waste management services (0.005) 
  
Educational services, and 0.008* 
health care and social assistance (0.004) 
  
Arts, entertainment, and recreation, 0.012** 
and accommodation and food services (0.005) 
  
Other services 0.019*** 
(except public administration) (0.007) 
  
Public administration 0.019*** 
 (0.006) 
  
Sample Size 3896 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.326 
Notes: *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors are given in 
parenthesis. All regressions include constants that are not shown here. The regression is by OLS. 
Table 6 - Number of Consumer Searches and Commuting Time 
 Dependent Variable:  Log Expected Number of Searches in a Zip Code 
  
Log Average Distance between 0.049*** 
Gas Stations in the Zip Code (0.005) 
  
Log Zip Code Area  0.418*** 
(square miles) (0.008) 
  
Log Zip Code Population Density  0.348*** 
(workers per square mile) (0.007) 
  
Log Zip Code Median Income -0.204*** 
(US$) (0.019) 
  
Less than 10 minutes 0.002* 
(percentage of workers) (0.001) 
  
10 to 14 minutes 0.013*** 
(percentage of workers) (0.002) 
  
15 to 19 minutes 0.005*** 
(percentage of workers) (0.002) 
  
20 to 24 minutes 0.000 
(percentage of workers) (0.002) 
  
25 to 29 minutes 0.000 
(percentage of workers) (0.002) 
  
30 to 34 minutes 0.004** 
(percentage of workers) (0.002) 
  
35 to 44 minutes -0.002 
(percentage of workers) (0.002) 
  
45 to 59 minutes 0.005** 
(percentage of workers) (0.002) 
  
Sample Size 9301 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.343 
Notes: *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors are given in 
parenthesis. All regressions include constants that are not shown here. The regression is by OLS. 
 
Table 7 - Number of Consumer Searches and Race 
 Dependent Variable:  Log Expected Number of Searches in a Zip Code 
  
Log Average Distance between 0.055** 
Gas Stations in the Zip Code (0.023) 
  
Log Zip Code Area  0.545*** 
(square miles) (0.040) 
  
Log Zip Code Population Density  0.453*** 
(workers per square mile) (0.036) 
  
Log Zip Code Median Income -0.345*** 
(US$) (0.076) 
  
Log Average Commuting Time  -0.409*** 
in the Zip Code (minutes) (0.088) 
  
White 0.008*** 
(percentage of workers) (0.002) 
  
Black or African American 0.012*** 
(percentage of workers) (0.003) 
  
Asian 0.007** 
(percentage of workers) (0.003) 
  
American Indian and Alaska Native 0.007 
(percentage of workers) (0.009) 
  
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander -0.012 
(percentage of workers) (0.013) 
  
Sample Size 957 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.260 
Notes: *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors are given in 
parenthesis. All regressions include constants that are not shown here. The regression is by OLS. 
 
 
Table 8 - Number of Consumer Searches and Sex 
 Dependent Variable:  Log Expected Number of Searches in a Zip Code 
  
Log Average Distance between 0.061*** 
Gas Stations in the Zip Code (0.009) 
  
Log Zip Code Area  0.485*** 
(square miles) (0.014) 
  
Log Zip Code Population Density  0.399*** 
(workers per square mile) (0.011) 
  
Log Zip Code Median Income -0.264*** 
(US$) (0.027) 
  
Log Average Commuting Time  -0.248*** 
in the Zip Code (minutes) (0.032) 
  
Female 0.007*** 
(percentage of workers) (0.002) 
  
Sample Size 4332 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.316 
Notes: *, ** and *** stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Standard errors are given in 
parenthesis. All regressions include constants that are not shown here. The regression is by OLS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Histogram of Gasoline Price Spreads in Zip Codes 
 
Notes: The horizontal axis shows the gasoline price spread, while the vertical axis shows the number of 
zip codes. Gasoline price spread is defined as the difference between the maximum and the minimum 
price in gas stations in a given zip code after controlling for gas-station and time fixed effects where the 
latter includes both day and hour fixed effects. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Histograms of Estimated Critical Search Cost Values 
 
Notes: The horizontal axis shows the search costs in U.S. dollars, while the vertical axes show the number 
of zip codes. 
